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Highlights
•	 European	electricity	systems	are	evolving	 towards	a	generation	
mix	that	is	more	decentralised,	less	predictable	and	less	flexible	
to	operate	due	to	the	large-scale	integration	of	renewables.	In	this	
context,	additional	flexibility	 is	expected	to	be	provided	by	 the	
demand	side.	This	implies	consumers	must	be	shifted	from	the	
current	‘passive’	role	to	providing	‘active’	demand	response.	
•	 The	objective	of	the	11th	THINK	report	is	to	assess	how	to	realise	
this	shift	 towards	active	consumers,	using	a	consumer-centred	
approach.	We	recognise	the	need	for	‘software’,	such	as	contracts,	
to	engage	consumers	in	addition	to	the	enabling	‘hardware’,	such	
as	smart	meters	and	appliances.	We	propose	recommendations	
for	consumer	empowerment	tools,	as	well	as	for	market	design	
and	 regulation	 that	would	 allow	 the	 full	 take-off	 of	 active	 de-
mand	response.
•	 A	prerequisite	of	consumer	engagement	is	to	have	an	adequate	
range	of	contracts	that	match	different	consumer	categories.	The	
Think	report	demonstrates	 that	consumers	are	diversified	both	
1	 	Topic	11	of	the	EU’s	FP7	funded	project	THINK.	The	project	report	is	available	
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in	their	flexibility	potential	and	in	their	preferences	on	a	set	of	
criteria	that	affect	their	willingness	to	participate	in	demand	re-
sponse.	We	propose	a	consumer	profiling	tool	that	not	only	em-
powers	 consumers	 to	make	 informed	 and	 appropriate	 choices,	
but	also	facilitates	 intermediaries	to	valorise	active	demand	re-
sponse.	
•	 Our	analysis	shows	that	one	single	market	player	might	not	have	
incentives	to	offer	an	adequate	range	of	demand	response	con-
tracts.	Therefore,	 it	 is	essential	 to	have	diversified	market	play-
ers	acting	as	demand	response	intermediaries.	The	entry	of	new	
market	players,	 such	as	consumer	cooperatives	or	 third	parties	
from	non-electricity	sectors,	needs	to	be	facilitated.	
•	 The	THINK	report	further	illustrates	that	the	retail	market	design	
needs	 to	be	adapted	 to	accommodate	active	demand	response.	
All	consumers	should	be	able	to	make	deliberate	choices	about	
their	 electricity	 supply,	 and	 to	valorise	 their	flexibility	 through	
active	demand	response.	We	propose	one	such	market	design	re-
ferred	to	as	‘real-time	market’.	
•	 Given	the	decentralised	and	local	character	of	demand	response,	
national	authorities	may	be	best	placed	to	implement	the	neces-
sary	measures	as	proposed	 in	 the	 report.	The	EU’s	 role	 should	
be	 focused	 on	 promoting	 contract	 pilot	 studies,	 disseminating	
the	results	of	decentralised	pilot	projects,	providing	guidance	or	
framework	 regarding	 consumer	 empowerment	 and	protection,	
and	rethinking	the	design	of	retail	market.	
•
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Background
Traditionally,	 electricity	 systems	 are	 operated	 in	 a	
‘load	following’	fashion,	meaning	that	the	flexibility	
to	maintain	the	instantaneous	balance	between	elec-
tric	power	supply	and	demand	is	mostly	provided	by	
the	generation side,	which	is	dominated	by	central-
ised,	 large-scale	 dispatchable	 power	 plants.	 Nowa-
days,	 the	European	electricity	 systems	are	evolving	
towards	a	generation	mix	that	is	more	decentralised,	
less	 predictable	 and	 less	 flexible	 to	 operate,	 due	 to	
the	large-scale	integration	of	renewables	to	meet	the	
20-20-20	targets.	In	this	context,	additional	flexibil-
ity	is	expected	to	be	provided	by	the	demand side.	
Indeed,	 in	 the	 short	 term,	 demand	 response	 can	
both	reduce	congestion	by	shifting	the	load	to	times	
when	there	is	idle	grid	capacity,	and	reduce	the	gen-
eration	costs	by	shifting	the	demand	to	times	when	
there	is	more	renewable	power	available.	As	a	con-
sequence,	 the	 long	term	value	of	demand	response	
lies	in	reduced	or	postponed	investments	in	network	
and	generation	capacity.	
The	importance	of	demand	response	as	a	means	of	
flexibility	has	been	widely	recognised	among	stake-
holders	 and	 policy	 makers	 in	 Europe,	 e.g.	 in	 the	
Energy	Roadmap	2050	(“energy saving and manag-
ing demand: a responsibility for all”),	in	the	Internal	
Market	Communication	(“stronger demand response 
in distribution networks”)	 and	 in	 the	 Energy	 Effi-
ciency	Directive	(“demand response is an important 
instrument for improving energy efficiency”).	 The	
gradual	roll-out	of	smart	meters	at	residential	 level	
and	the	deployment	of	smart	grids	are	expected	to	
provide	 the	 ‘hardware’	 for	demand	response.	Thus,	
how	to	engage	consumers	to	participate	in	demand	
response	is	becoming	a	pressing	issue.	
There	is,	however,	significant	scepticism	about	con-
sumer	 engagement.	 Some	 argue	 that	 the	 financial	
impact	on	consumers’	electricity	bills	is	too	small	for	
the	consumer	to	react.	Some	claim	that	consumers	
do	not	like	or	cannot	handle	the	additional	complex-
ity	 introduced	 by	 demand	 response.	 Privacy	 con-
cerns	 and	 fear	 of	 reduced	 consumption	 autonomy	
make	up	two	more	arguments	against	a	meaningful	
level	 of	 active	 demand	 response.	 Accepting	 these	
statements	means	that	we	 leave	consumers	to	drift	
on	their	own	and	admitting	that	 there	 is	no	future	
for	 demand	 response.	 In	 this	 report,	 we	 challenge	
that	vision	and	provide	an	analytical	 framework	to	
assess	consumers’	potential	and	willingness	 to	par-
ticipate	in	active	demand	response.	On	that	basis,	we	
present	 recommendations	 to	 empower	and	protect	
consumers	in	their	shift	to	active	demand	response	
participants.
Consumers’ potential and willingness to 
participate in demand response
Recent	 pilot	 studies	 show	 a	 divergent	 response	 by	
consumers:	some	consumers	opt	out	or	drop	out	of	
the	studies,	some	show	limited	signs	of	responsive-
ness	and	other	consumers	effectively	and	significant-
ly	respond	to	signals.	It	is	thus	important	to	realise	
that	consumers	have	diverse	preferences	which	are	
engaged	by	different	signals.
To	 capture	 this	 consumer	 diversity	 we	 propose	 a	
two-dimensional	framework	to	categorise	consum-
ers:	(1)	according	to	how	consumers	are	potentially	
able	to	participate	 in	demand	response	as	reflected	
in	their	 load mix,	and	(2)	according	to	the	prefer-
ences	on	a	set	of	criteria	that	affect	their	willingness	
to	participate	in	demand	response.	
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Categorisation dimension 1: Consumer load mix
The	potential	of	consumers	to	participate	in	demand	
response	 is	 determined	 by	 the	 flexibility	 of	 their	
load.	It	is	noteworthy	that	such	flexibility	is	related	
not	only	to	the	capacities	of	the	smart	appliances	that	
a	consumer	possesses,	but	also	to	how	the	consumer	
uses	his	smart	and	dumb	appliances.	To	capture	this	
richness,	we	propose	a	categorisation	of	load	as	de-
picted	in	Box	1.
Consumer	load,	i.e.	the	electric	power	consumption,	
can	first	be	categorised	in	(1)	storable load	(e.g.	heat-
ing,	 fridge,	 electric	 vehicle,	 etc.)	 and	 non-storable 
load.	Next,	non-storable	load	can	be	further	catego-
rised	 in	 (2)	 shiftable load	 (laundry,	 tumble	 dryer,	
dish	washer,	etc.)	and	non-shiftable load.	Non-shifta-
ble	load	then	is	further	categorised	in	(3)	curtailable 
load	(lighting,	TV,	kettle,	stove,	etc.)	and	non-curtail-
able load.	The	remaining	non-curtailable	load	can	be	
classified	as	(4)	base load (TV2,	burglary	alarm,	au-
2	 	Depending	on	how	a	consumer	uses	an	appliance	to	gener-
ate	end-user	services,	an	appliance	can	be	base	load	(e.g.	World	
tomation,	etc.).	The	load	refers	to	net	electric	power	
consumption	from	the	grid	and	is	thus	equal	to	the	
total	power	consumption	corrected	for	(5)	self-gen-
erated	electricity	by	the	‘prosumer’.	The	flexibility	in-
creases	from	the	base	load	to	storable	load.	
Together,	 the	 different	 proportions	 of	 these	 load	
types	make	up	the	consumer	load	mix.	Consumers	
can	then	be	categorised	according	to	their	dominant	
load	type,	indicating	their	degree	of	flexibility.
Categorisation dimension 2: Consumer preferences
The	willingness	 of	 consumers	 to	 participate	 in	de-
mand	response	can	be	associated	with	the	consumer	
preferences	on	a	wide	range	of	criteria	that	includes,	
but	is	not	limited	to,	financial	compensation,	proso-
cial	motivation,	price	and	volume	risk,	complexity,	
and	autonomy	and	privacy.	
Cup	final	on	TV)	one	moment	and	curtailable	(e.g.	a	re-run	of	
a	TV	series)	at	other	times.
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It	 is	 important	 to	note	 that	 consumers	are	not	ho-
mogenous	 in	their	perception	of	 these	criteria.	For	
instance,	 loss	 of	 autonomy	 can	 be	 a	 cost	 for	 one	
consumer	 whilst	 a	 benefit	 for	 another;	 and	 differ-
ent	consumers	might	attribute	different	values	to	the	
same	criterion	as	 risk	might	be	highly	 relevant	 for	
one	consumer	and	a	minor	issue	for	another.	There-
fore,	consumers’	different	preferences	on	these	crite-
ria	will	also	condition	the	way	they	wish	to	partici-
pate	 in	 demand	 response.	Consumers	 can	 then	 be	
categorised	according	to	similar	sets	of	preferences.
Demand response contract: the missing 
piece in the puzzle?
Contracts	are	currently	a	missing	piece	in	the	puz-
zle	 of	 demand	 response	 take-off;	 they	 have	 been	
relatively	 under-researched,	 especially	 regarding	
the	 consumer-oriented	 impact.	However,	 contracts	
with	 demand	 response	 intermediaries	 (sometimes	
referred	 to	 as	 ‘aggregators’)	 are	 the	 ‘software’	 for	
consumers	 to	participate	 in	demand	response.	The	
contract	 terms	 regarding	 the	 financial	 compensa-
tion,	the	periods	of	activation,	the	capacity	require-
ment,	etc.	are	closely	related	to	consumers’	potential	
and	willingness	to	participate	in	active	demand	re-
sponse.	Without	understanding	the	full	implication	
of	the	contract,	a	consumer	can	hardly	be	mobilised	
into	an	active	consumer.	Therefore,	the	THINK	re-
port	 adopts	 a	 consumer-centred	 approach	 and	 fo-
cuses	on	demand	response	contracts.	
Based	on	the	established	literature	and	experiences	
from	 industrial	 consumers’	 demand	 response	 and	
pilot	 studies,	 we	 distinguish	 five	 generic3	 contract	
types:	(1)	price-based	static	contracts,	e.g.	time	of	use	
(TOU)	pricing;	 (2)	price-based	dynamic	 contracts,	
e.g.	dynamic	pricing,	real-time	pricing,	and	critical	
3	 	The	generic	contract	type	encompasses	a	great	variety	in	ex-
act	contract	terms,	i.e.	the	actual	establishment	of	price,	quan-
tity,	time	intervals	et	cetera.
Box 2: Contract interpretation of consumer criteria
Contract Price risk Volume risk Complexity Autonomy/  Privacy loss
Financial 
compensation
Time of use 
pricing Limited None Limited None Limited
Dynamic pricing High None High None High	potential
Fixed load capping None Limited	 High Limited Limited
Dynamic load 
capping None High High Limited High	potential
Direct load 
control None None None High
Limited/	
High	potential
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peak	pricing;	(3)	volume-based	static	contracts,	e.g.	
fixed	load	capping;	(4)	volume-based	dynamic	con-
tracts,	 e.g.	dynamic	 load	capping	and	 interruptible	
contracts;	and	(5)	control-based	contracts,	e.g.	direct	
load	control	contract.	We	demonstrate	that	there	is	
an	 interaction	 between	 the	 contract	 types	 and	 the	
consumers’	load	mixes/preferences.	
The first interaction: consumer load mix and 
contract
Consumers’	load	mixes	may	determine	whether	they	
are	able	to	meet	the	requirements	of	certain	demand	
response	 contracts.	 For	 instance,	 a	 curtailable load 
mix	can	interrupt	load	instantly	and	is	thus	particu-
larly	able	to	respond	to	dynamic	contracts,	such	as	
dynamic	pricing	and	dynamic	load	capping.	A	shift-
able load mix	needs	some	planning	of	load	and	thus	
benefits	from	static	signals	that	are	notified	well	 in	
advance	and	are	less	volatile	during	the	day.	Hence,	
it	matches	TOU	pricing	and	fixed	load	capping.	
The second interaction: consumer preferences and 
contract
The	five	retained	contract	types	also	give	an	explicit	
or	 implicit	 interpretation	 to	 the	 aforementioned	
consumer	criteria4.	As	 shown	 in	Box	2,	 some	con-
tracts	 impose	 high	 risks	 to	 consumers	 (dynamic	
pricing	and	load	capping	contracts),	whereas	other	
transfer	limited	or	even	no	risk	to	consumers	(TOU	
pricing,	fixed	load	capping	and	direct	load	control);	
complexity	is	higher	for	volume-based	contracts	and	
for	dynamic	contracts;	autonomy/privacy	loss	is	ab-
sent	in	pricing	contracts,	while	high	for	direct	load	
control;	 and	 financial	 compensation	 has	 a	 higher	
4	 	 Except	 for	 prosocial	motivation	which	 is	 intrinsic	 to	 the	
consumer,	and	should	apply	equally	to	all	contract	types.	
potential	when	more	risk	and	complexity	is	passed	
on	to	consumers.	As	a	result,	consumers	may	prefer	
certain	contracts	depending	on	their	preferences	on	
these	criteria.	
A toolkit of consumer empowerment and 
protection
The	 above	 analysis	 demonstrates	 that	 there	 is	 no	
clear	best	contract	for	all	consumers;	the	appropri-
ateness	of	a	contract	depends	on	consumers’	specific	
load	mix	as	well	as	 their	preferences	on	a	series	of	
criteria.	Hence,	there	is	a	need	for	an	adequate	range	
of	 contracts,	 including	 the	 five	 contract	 types	 dis-
cussed	 above.	 In	 other	 words,	 consumers	 need	 to	
be	provided	with	enough	options	in	order	to	be	en-
gaged	in	active	demand	response.	
But	this	availability	of	contract	options	alone	is	not	
enough;	 consumers	 also	need	 to	be	 empowered	 to	
make	 informed	 and	 appropriate	 choices.	 Indeed,	
even	if	 the	adequate	range	of	contracts	exists,	con-
sumers	may	still	face	difficulties	to	choose	the	right	
contract	because	of	a	lack	of	knowledge	about	their	
flexibility	potential,	insufficient	awareness	of	the	im-
plications	 of	 contracts,	misalignment	 of	 their	 load	
mix	and	preferences,	etc.	The	THINK	report	further	
proposes	a	 toolkit	of	 consumer	empowerment	and	
protection as	follows:	
(1)	 Mandatory	 consumer	 profiling	 is	 key	 to	 raise	
consumers’	 awareness	 and	 to	 educate	 them	
on	 impacts	 of	 different	 options.	The	 profiling	
should	be	the	result	of	a	standard	survey	on	the	
consumer’s	 load	mix	 and	preferences	 on	 a	 set	
of	criteria	that	are	implied	by	the	contract.	This	
profiling	could	also	facilitate	market	players	to	
establish	their	business	models	with	consumers.	
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(2)	 Independent	contract	comparison	tool	needs	to	
be	established.	The	provider	of	such	tool	should	
be	certified	and	the	methodology	(e.g.	included	
parameters)	 should	 be	 regulated.	 Transparent	
information,	e.g.	through	disaggregated	billing,	
should	 be	 mandatory	 to	 allow	 adequate	 con-
tract	benchmarking	in	the	comparison	tool.
(3)	 Monitoring	 and	 optimisation	 of	 the	 range	 of	
contracts	helps	to	limit	the	complexity	of	con-
tract	 terms,	 while	 still	 allowing	 competition	
and	innovation	in	contract	design.	
(4)	 Adequate	 data	 protection	 is	 needed	 to	 raise	
consumers’	trust	to	reveal	personal	information	
before	and	after	signing	a	contract.
(5)	 Effective	 dispute	 resolution	 is	 necessary	 as	 a	
fall-back	option	to	enable	efficient	switching	of	
contracts	or	intermediaries	by	consumers.
(6)	 Vulnerable	consumers	should	have	access	to	as-
sistance	 and	 protection	 to	 prevent	 them	 from	
being	penalised	for	their	inability	to	provide	ac-
tive	demand	response.	
What is beyond? — The market design
While	 the	 aforementioned	 recommendations	 em-
power	consumers	to	handle	demand	response	con-
tracts,	 these	contracts	are	embedded	in	an	existing	
market	design,	with	market	players	freely	proposing	
contracts	 to	 potential	 customers,	 valorising	 active	
demand	response	 in	different	market	places.	Using	
the	contract	as	a	starting	point,	we	then	address	the	
following	issues:
How to guarantee there is an adequate range of 
contract for consumer choices? 
Our	 analysis	 shows	 that	 one	 single	 market	 player	
might	not	have	incentives	to	offer	an	adequate	range	
of	demand	response	contracts,	because	of	 their	di-
vergent	 business	 objectives	 and	 risk	 preferences.	
Therefore,	 it	 is	essential	 to	have	a	diversified	set	of	
market	players	acting	as	demand	response	interme-
diaries.	We	further	identify	what	may	hinder	an	ad-
equate	range	of	intermediaries	to	emerge,	and	pro-
pose	the	following	measures	for	 facilitating	market	
entry	for	new	market	players:
(7)	 A	demand	response	 license	provides	a	 ‘quality	
label’	for	new	actors	to	build	trust	with	consum-
ers.
(8)	 Disaggregated	billing	allows	better	comparison	
of	offers	from	intermediaries	who	offer	bundled	
services	(e.g.	supply	and	demand	response)	and	
those	who	do	not.
(9)	 Non-discriminatory	 entry	 to	 the	 demand	 re-
sponse	market	and	freedom	to	offer	services	to	
consumers	for	intermediaries.
(10)	Non-discriminatory	 access	 to	 electricity	 mar-
kets,	including	balancing	markets,	and	bilateral	
procurement	mechanisms	for	ancillary	services	
and	congestion	management.
(11)	Non-discriminatory	access	to	data,	e.g.	to	pre-
vent	the	transfer	of	information	from	the	regu-
lated	activities	to	the	deregulated	activities	in	an	
integrated	supplier-DSO.
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Is the current retail market design suitable to 
accommodate active demand response? 
The	current	retail	market	starts	from	the	assumption	
of	low	elasticity	of	demand,	which	is	expressed	by	at	
least	two	facts:	first,	the	supply	contracts	are	by	de-
fault	offering	unlimited	electricity	supply	to	consum-
ers,	and	in	many	Member	States,	at	a	regulated	retail	
tariff;	 second,	balancing	costs	 are	 socialised,	partly	
by	the	supplier	among	his	customers,	and	partly	by	
the	 TSO	 among	 all	 network	 users.	 Such	 arrange-
ments	 severely	 reduce	 the	 incentives	 for	 consum-
ers	to	become	active.	Therefore,	in	the	long	term,	it	
is	necessary	 to	 rethink	 the	market	design	with	 the	
anticipated	 active	 role	 of	 consumers	 in	mind.	The	
THINK	report	proposes	one	such	design	referred	to	
as	‘real-time market’:
(12)		The	real-time	market	implies	that	both	the	sup-
ply	and	the	demand	side	need	to	express	their	
willingness	to	sell	and	buy	guaranteed	electric-
ity	in	real	time.	It	thus	allows	all	consumers	to	
make	deliberate	 choices	 about	 their	 electricity	
supply,	and	to	incorporate	their	flexibility	into	
such	 choices.	 As	 a	 result,	 balancing	 costs	 are	
largely	 dissocialised,	 providing	 incentives	 for	
active	demand	response.	
Conclusion
To	sum	up,	the	scepticism	about	consumer	engage-
ment	 is	 fallacious,	as	we	have	demonstrated	 in	our	
original	 approach	 focusing	 on	 contracts,	 that	 con-
sumers can be engaged	if	they	have	options	that	re-
flect	 their	diversity	 and	are	 adequately	 empowered	
to	make	 choices.	The	THINK	 report	 also	provides	
recommendations	on	how to get there,	including	a	
toolkit	of	consumer	empowerment	and	protection,	
necessary	 adaptation	 of	 market	 rules	 and	 regula-
tion,	as	well	as	a	new	retail	market	design.	Therefore,	
the	 shift	 towards	 active	demand	 response	 requires	
substantial	 efforts,	 but	 it	 is feasible	 and	 necessary.	
Indeed,	 a	 functioning	 retail	market	 could	not	ma-
terialise	without	the	active	participation	of	consum-
ers,	 and	 the	 decarbonisation	 targets	 can	 hardly	 be	
achieved	without	flexibility	provided	by	the	demand	
side.	The	 long	 term	 paradigm	 shift	 of	 the	 electric	
power	systems	needs	to	be	translated	in	a	step-wise	
process	that	should	start	already	now.
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